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This study explores the computer-mediated communication (CMC) practices of the transnational civil society organizations involved in the United Nationssponsored World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). Informed by international regime theory, this study asks four speciªc research questions. (1) To what degree did civil society use CMC to organize its work and participate in WSIS? (2) How did the civil society use CMC? What barriers did it face, and how did it overcome those barriers? (3) To what extent do these CMC practices reveal the existence of policy networks and their linkages with epistemic communities? (4) What was the effect of civil society's use of CMC? Using both quantitative and qualitative data from an international survey and archival research, the study ªnds that e-mail lists are the primary CMC tools used within the sector, although attempts have been made to introduce
Bringing the global Information Society into existence requires four interrelated foci: (1) ªnancing and developing an information infrastructure, (2) building a legal and regulatory framework, (3) stimulating multi-lingual/cultural content creation, and (4) human capacity development. Each of these areas is embedded in a dense framework of speciªc information and communication technology (ICT) policies. These ICT policy issues range from arcane technical matters of Internet domain names, to privacy, security, and intellectual property, and even further to the socially oriented issues of human rights, culturally sensitive content creation, and the empowerment of youth, women, and indigenous peoples. Each of these issue areas has a complex set of institutional processes through which issues are presented, framed, reªned, debated, and eventually recommended as speciªc policy options (Kingdon, 2003) .
While governments are playing a leading role in negotiating the consensus required for the emergence of an international regime to govern the global Information Society, they cannot facilitate this emergence alone (Krasner, 1983 (Krasner, , 1991 Cogburn, 2003 Cogburn, , 2004 Braman, 2004) . The comprehensive and far-reaching implications of the Information Society demand the active participation of multiple and diverse stakeholders, who can bring to the table their knowledge, expertise, energy, ideas, resources, and solutions. Any stable regime that emerges from these processes requires substantial international cooperation across public, private, and civil society sectors in the development of consensus on the principles, values, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that will characterize the global governance of the Information Society.
Frequently, this consensus building, as well as intense contestation, occurs within speciªc ICT policy processes at national, regional, and international levels. Some of these policy formulation processes are driven by highly structured, formal international organizations, such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), World Trade Organization (WTO), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and other United Nations agencies such as United Nations Educational, Scientiªc, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Other highly inºuential policy processes, but sometimes less visible, are driven by quasi autonomous and independent, international, private-sector organizations wielding tremendous inºuence in global ICT policy. These organizations include the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Global Information Infrastructure Commission (GIIC), Global Business Dialogue on Electronic Commerce (GBDe), and the World Economic Forum (WEF). Collectively, these multiple and competing institutional processes contribute to the global governance of the GII and potentially to the Information Society as a whole.
Within these policy processes, international conferences may sometimes play an important role as locations of contestation and consensus for the elaboration and acceptance of principles, values, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures among the participating stakeholders (Young, 1995; Dunn, 1996; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Weilemann, 2000; Cogburn, 2004) . Most of these important conferences are organized by one or more of the formal or informal organizations listed above, and are highly exclusionary and elite decision-making processes (Cogburn, 2004) . Increasing calls for multistakeholder participation in global governance have opened the doors to many of these elite processes (WEF, 2004) . However, in most international conferences addressing information and communication policy over the last decade, developing countries and civil society organizations have been unable to wield sufªcient inºuence to engender policy outcomes that meet their socio-economic and development goals (Cogburn, 1996; CTO, 2003; Cogburn, 2003; MacLean, 2003) . Explanations for this lack of inºuence are legion, and range from analyses of geopolitical and economic power disparities to the inability of developing countries and civil society organizations to effectively marshal the knowledge and information resources required for data-driven public policy. The answers are most likely combinations of these factors, complicated further by the complexity of the actual regime formation processes themselves. What we do know is that simply participating in these policy formulation processes does not automatically lead to impact or effective participation.
Negotiating within these intricate international processes to achieve speciªc policy objectives is a daunting task, even for the most seasoned governments and private sector organizations. However, it is even more challenging for the international civil society organizations that are participating increasingly in these global multistakeholder governance processes. Complicating the role of civil society even further is its intense heterogeneity, both in the issues around which it is organized and in its geographic and political orientation. Increasingly, civil society organizations are forming themselves into what Keck & Sikkink (1998) call transnational advocacy networks, and human rights-oriented organizations seem to be the most dominant, followed by women's rights and environmental activists (p. 10).
The purpose of this article is to better understand the current structure of transnational advocacy networks in the ICT policy arena, and to assess their potential for engaging in geographically distributed knowledge work. We accomplish these goals through a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the computer-mediated communication (CMC) practices of the civil society sector involved in the United Nations-sponsored World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). We also assess the impact of these CMC practices on the development of policy-actor networks and epistemic communities within the WSIS process. Informed by international regime theory, we analyze how geographically distributed and ideologically diverse elements of transnational civil society organized to participate in a complex global information and communication policy process, previously dominated by government and private sector representatives.
This study poses four major research questions. The ªrst question asks, Did the civil society groupings involved in WSIS use computer-mediated communication to organize their work and participate in WSIS? The second research question asks, How did the civil society groupings involved in WSIS use computer-mediated communications? What barriers did these civil society groupings face, and how did they overcome those barriers? (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; O'Brien, et al., 2000; CTO, 2003; Cogburn, 2003; MacLean, 2003) , most of the literature exploring the speciªc factors that limit the inºuence of developing countries and civil society organizations in these international ICT processes is largely theoretical and anecdotal. What does exist points to several potential social, political, technological, and economic variables that contribute to this ineffectiveness. This research program begins to empirically test a theoretical model of multistakeholder global governance (Cogburn, 2004 ) through a mixed-method analysis of the international civil society participation in WSIS and points to some of the potential uses of CMC tools to alter the existing imbalances.
While many of the international conferences described above are important, United Nationssponsored world conferences are in a class by themselves, addressing issues as diverse as human rights, racism, gender, and the environment (Schechter, 2001) . Under UN auspices, a "summit" is an international conference that meets at the highest level of ofªcials, including heads of state, CEOs from the private sector, and executive directors and presidents from civil society. A "world summit" is an even more special designation, reserved for those global conferences that attempt to bring together as much of the leadership of humanity as possible to forge a common vision for a particular international issue. Previous world summits have included the World Summit on Sustainable Development, World Conference Against Racism, World Peace Summit, and World Summit for Social Development. The most recent of these events is the United Nationssponsored World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS).
Ofªcially, WSIS emerged as a result of Resolution 73 of the 1998 Plenipotentiary Meeting of the ITU held in Minneapolis (ITU, 1998) . As the governing body of the ITU, this resolution at the "plenipot" instructed the Secretary General of the ITU to "place the question of holding a world summit on the Information Society on the agenda of the United Na- (ITU, 1998) . After agreement from the CEB, the UN decided that Secretary General Kofª Anan would provide the high patronage for the Summit, with organizational responsibility resting with the ITU (UNGA 15/183, 2002) .
Organizers of the Summit had the explicit goal of forging an international consensus among the major actors regarding the principles and decision-making procedures-the international regime-of the global Information Society in order that it might beneªt the majority of the world's citizens.
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WSIS is a unique example of the international ICT conferences described above, and illustrates these global governance processes. One example of this uniqueness is that WSIS is attempting to address perhaps the widest range of information and communication technology policy issues of any previous international conference of this magnitude. Second, the WSIS process represents an explicit, though ºawed, attempt at global multistakeholder governance, with the active recruitment and attempted involvement of thousands of civil society and private sector actors on a relatively co-equal basis with the governmental and intergovernmental actors that normally inhabit these formal intergovernmental processes. Finally, from the beginning, WSIS was authorized as one summit, to occur in two phases (UNGA, 2002) . The two phases were the result of a political compromise between potential developed and developing country hosts. Phase I was authorized for Geneva, December 10-14, 2003, and Phase II was authorized for Tunisia, November 16-18, 2005. 3 The organizers are adamant in saying that WSIS is "one summit with two parts" and not two summits.
Unofªcially, there has been a long string of international and regional meetings outlining and laying the groundwork for most of the issues being addressed by the WSIS process. Interestingly, most of these earlier meetings have been largely ignored by the ofªcial WSIS processes. Some of the earliest meetings held in the 1970s and '80s addressed the global imbalances of information creation and dissemination. The movement around these issues became known as the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). The NWICO movement galvanized activists around the world in response to a UNESCO report entitled "Many Voices, One World" (UNESCO, 1980) . 4 In some ways the CRIS Campaign (Communication Rights in the Information Society), one of the leading organizations involved in the WSIS civil society which argues for a broader "communication society" over a narrower "Information Society," is the intellectual descendent of the NWICO (Ó Siochrú, 2004) . By organizing its network as a "campaign" and framing communication as a "right," the CRIS campaign is probably the best structured organization within the WSIS civil society to represent the archetypal transnational advocacy network (Keck & Sikkink, 1998 (Cogburn, 1996) . For various reasons, the ISAD agenda lost momentum and global Information Society issues moved to other international forum such as the Global Knowledge Conferences held in Toronto in 1997 and Kuala Lumpur in 2000 (Cogburn, 2004 WSIS was promoted as a major step forward in global multistakeholder governance, especially in the processes of formulating global ICT policy. UN General Assembly Resolution 56/183 recommended that the multiple planning processes for the Summit take place in an open and transparent manner.
5 In addition to the government representatives from both developed and developing countries, paragraph 5 of this resolution "encourages other intergovernmental organizations, including international and regional institutions, non-governmental organizations, civil society and the private sector to contribute to, and actively participate in, the intergovernmental preparatory process of the Summit and the Summit itself" (UNGA 15/83, 2002) .
So the transnational civil society was invited to participate in WSIS; but what is "civil society?" Deªning and recognizing an international civil society sector to participate as a legitimate "stakeholder" within the WSIS processes is complex. Keck & Sikkink (1998) point to the difªculty of organizing a truly "global civil society" and instead prefer to focus in their work on more tightly integrated transnational advocacy networks. These transnational networks of activists are organized largely around shared "principled ideas or values" (Keck & Sikkink, (1998, p. 1) and operate in a transnational "arena of struggle, a fragmented and contested area where, 'the politics of transnational civil society is centrally about the way in which certain groups emerge and are legitimized by governments, institutions, and other groups '" (pp. 33-34) . This is a fairly accurate description of the organized civil society participating within the WSIS processes, the structure of which illustrates the tension between being "legitimized by governments [and] institutions" (namely the civil society structure called the Bureau) on the one hand and being legitimized by other groups and the broadest possible civil society representatives participating in the WSIS (namely the amorphous civil society structure called the Plenary) on the other hand.
Nonetheless, within the WSIS processes, some of the civil society participants have loosely deªned themselves as "organisations-including movements, networks and other entities-which are autonomous from the State, are not intergovernmental or do not represent the private sector, and which in principle, are non-proªt-making, act locally, nationally and internationally, in defence and promotion of social, economic and cultural interests and for mutual beneªt" (WSIS CS, 2003 Regardless of the deªnition used, the civil society sector represents a tremendous diversity of voices and perspectives that are critical to development of a global Information Society. This diversity could matter greatly in the ICT policy formulation process, bringing new ideas and energy to bear on old, seemingly intractable problems. To engage in the policy processes with which they are expert (such as human rights, privacy, open-source software, and Internet governance), many of these civil society actors participate actively in what some scholars call "transnational advocacy networks" (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) and form deliberate linkages with what other scholars call knowledge networks or "epistemic communities" (Haas, 1992) . The diversity of expertise and perspectives represented by the transnational civil society participating in WSIS is critical to the development of the Information Society.
However, there are serious challenges affecting the participation of civil society in global multistakeholder governance processes such as WSIS. For example, these organizations vary tremen- (UNGA 15/183, 2002) . dously in size, strength, experience, organizational capacity, ICT policy issue area, and focus. Perhaps the biggest hurdle is that the members of these organizations are geographically distributed and can have a presence in both developed and developing countries. Finding ways to knit these geographically distributed and diverse organizational strands into a coherent and representative international civil society tapestry that functions as an effective transnational advocacy network drawing on the best epistemic communities from around the world and engaging effectively in the highly complex WSIS institutional processes is a signiªcant challenge. Newly emerging organizational models, such as the policy collaboratory, may offer some solutions to the challenges of geographically distributed knowledge work between developed and developing countries (Cogburn, 2003) . However, such solutions require an interdisciplinary approach and draw on insights and lessons that range from sociology and communication studies, to political science, to computersupported cooperative work.
This phase of the project employed a concurrent mixed-method design to study the impact of computer-mediated communication on civil society participation in WSIS. The study started in the period before Prepcom-3 in September 2003 and lasted until the Summit in December 2003. Two primary data collection methods were used: (1) a survey of global ICT policy leaders and (2) content analysis of archival data. Both of these methods are explored and explained below.
From November 24, 2003 through January 29, 2004 , the principal investigator conducted a survey of global ICT policy leaders using a commercially available Web-based survey tool. 6 The survey was pilot tested in person by a convenience sample of delegates during Prepcom-3 in September 2003. To identify the pool of potential participants in the survey, an initial sampling frame (n ϭ 3,190) was developed from the published lists of participants in the three WSIS Preparatory Committee meetings (Prepcom-1, Prepcom-2, Prepcom-3, Prepcom-3a) in Geneva and the ad hoc Content & Themes meeting (Paris).
After extensive cleaning of the sampling frame, including the removal of duplicate names and incorrect addresses, the ªnal survey was sent out on November 24, 2003 to a revised frame (n ϭ 2,018) representing the possible participants in the survey. Both the invitation letter and the survey itself were in English (prefaced by a brief statement in Spanish and French on the importance of linguistic diversity and an apology for the English-only survey). The survey contained 83 questions (both open-ended and closed-ended), including three important nested components based on skip logic/conditional questions. In addition to individual demographic measures (age, gender, education, training, income, region, race/ethnicity, and language) and organizational characteristics (organizational size and type), the survey included a range of important measures, such as existing levels of trust, experience with ICT tools, levels of satisfaction and success in the WSIS process, experience with ICT policy processes, participation in policy networks, and use and identiªca-tion of epistemic resources.
One reminder invitation was sent out to the nonresponders on December 16, 2003. Of those ICT policy leaders contacted, a substantial number (n ϭ 322) responded, resulting in an acceptable response rate (19%) for a Web-based elite survey (Sproull, 1986; Kittleson, 1995; Nucifora, 2002; Fricker and Schonlau, 2002; Drizin, 2003; Alvarez, Sherman, & VanBeselaer, 2003) . Finally, the study sample was closely correlated to both the initial frame and the full participant database on key demographic variables (e.g., region, organizational type, and gender) giving us a high level of conªdence that the survey data represented the population. For some analyses, a subsample of civil society delegates was analyzed (n ϭ 74, 28%). These civil society respondents were closely correlated with the full participant database on key demographic variables (e.g., region and gender), giving us conªdence in the subsample as well.
the Resumed Prepcom-3a as a registered civil society delegate. He also attended the actual Summit from December 7-14 with a team of four doctoral and graduate student researchers. As delegates, researchers were allowed access to all of the ofªcial documents of Prepcom-3, Prepcom-3a, and the Summit, as well as all of the documents made available to delegates by other delegates and interested parties. Many of these documents were collected and added to an N6 database created for the project. 7 N6 was used for review, coding, and qualitative analysis of the documents. Most important among these documents were the initial and subsequent drafts of the WSIS Declaration of Principles, WSIS Plan of Action, and WSIS Rules and Procedures.
In addition, the entire public e-mail archive of the civil society public plenary (5 MB) and bureau (1 MB), as well as numerous public documents, were added to the N6 database for qualitative analysis. The database covers a 10-month period from March 13, 2003 through December 13, 2003 , and at this point only focuses on content in English. The initial cleaning (removal of images and ªle transfer encoding) and organization of the data yielded 38 text ªles, 148 free nodes, and 116 tree nodes. 8 Appendix A presents the initial axial coding schema used in the content analysis. Table 1 illustrates the data on which the content analysis was performed. In the presentation of data from these public archives, all identifying information has been removed (although active participants in these processes may certainly recognize themselves).
The ªrst research question in this study asks, "Did the civil society groupings involved in WSIS use computer-mediated communication to organize their work and participate in the WSIS?" We begin to answer this question by analyzing overall civil society participation in the WSIS processes, relative to governments and private-sector actors.
Characteristics of WSIS Civil Society
While by no means representative of any "global civil society," there has been a large and diverse participation from the international civil society sector at each stage of the various WSIS preparatory processes. As illustrated in Table 2 , delegates representing civil society consistently outnumbered those delegates from the private sector, and were surpassed in absolute numbers only by the government representatives. Based on the subsample of civil society delegates from the survey (n ϭ 74, 28%), we learn more about the characteristics of the members of the WSIS civil society (which was also supported by participant observation).
The majority of civil society delegates were male (n ϭ 45, 64%). The modal education level was a master's degree, with a slight majority (n ϭ 36, 52%) reporting to be of either low or middle income in their own countries. Western Europe represented the largest geographic region within the study sample (n ϭ 23, 32%), followed by Africa (n ϭ 19, 27%). Most of the respondents (n ϭ 41, 58%) did not speak English as their primary language. Most were directors or managers within their organization and "education and academia" was the most frequently cited organizational theme.
Conºicts and Tensions Within WSIS Civil Society
Some of the strongest conºicts in the WSIS civil society come from within its own organizational structures. These tensions emerged out of questions of legitimacy. Much of the complex WSIS civil society structure has evolved organically from the earliest Prepcom meetings. These structures include multiple self-constituting caucuses and other moving parts. For example, there are distributed working groups on Content & Themes (C&T), a Civil Society Plenary (CSP), 19 Thematic Caucuses & Working Groups, and various ad hoc drafting committees. Very few formal decision-making procedures exist within the sector, and nearly all decisions are made by consensus and/or acquiescence. There is a broad diversity of interests represented by the international civil society sector involved in WSIS, including: education, academia, and research; science and technology; media; creators and promoters of culture; cities and local authorities; trade unions; NGOs; youth; gender; volunteers; indigenous people; networks and coalitions; multistakeholder partnerships; philanthropic institutions; think tanks; and people with disabilities. This diversity matters to the development of an Information Society, but is also one source of weakness and tension within the WSIS civil society, as groups work to ensure that the ideological issues that hold them together are adequately represented by statements emanating in the name of WSIS civil society. Also, as we are reminded by Keck & Sikkink (1998): This is not to suggest that advocacy networks are egalitarian structures. We recognize the asymmetrical or lopsided nature of most network interactions. Power is exercised within networks, and power often follows from resources, of which a preponderance exists within northern network nodes. Stronger actors in the network do often drown out the weaker ones, because of the nature of the network form of organization, many actors (including powerful northern ones) are transformed through their participation in the network. (p. 207)
These resource and power dynamics certainly exist within the WSIS civil society, even within the most "open and transparent" part of the structure, the Plenary. The resources that feed these power dynamics are primarily technology resources-who has access to the "ofªcial" Web sites and mailing lists, and who can add or create caucuses and working groups (by virtue of giving them space on the "ofªcial" Web sites and mailing lists)-and geographical resources who are located in Geneva, Paris, or New York, and physically attend the formal and informal meetings quickly, easily, and frequently.
While much of the structure evolved organically, gaining its legitimacy from its openness, transparency, and attempts to involve literally anybody meeting their self-mandated description of civil society and having an e-mail address, a second more "authoritative" structure was imposed onto civil society by the governments and conference organizers.
During Prepcom-2, the CSP authorized the creation of a Civil Society Bureau (CSB), comprising 20 representatives from diverse civil society "families," with the stated function of "facilitating and engaging as much as possible the contribution of the civil society and the elaboration of a common and 22 WSIS Geneva n/a n/a n/a n/a shared vision of the Information Society" (CSB, 2003) . While there is evidence to indicate the CSP did indeed authorize the CSB, it was suggested and comprised primarily by the Government Bureau and the Summit organizers. Figure 1 illustrates the overall structure and anarchic nature of the civil society sector.
Information Technologies and International Development
DIVERSITY MATTERS: CIVIL SOCIETY IN WSIS
Controversial Nature of the CSB
Within the various structures of civil society, the CSB is perhaps the most controversial. The controversy is based primarily on the top-down way in which the CSB was constituted and implemented, as well as the ongoing concern that it lacks transparency and legitimacy. Many active participants within the civil society sector feel as if the conference organizers imposed the CSB as a way to limit the effectiveness of the organic, bottom-up organizational processes that emerged after the earliest Prepcoms. These concerns are ampliªed when the Bureau is allowed to make decisions about tangible resources, such as allocating ofªce space, determining fellowships for Prepcom events, and allocating entry badges-overpasses-into the WSIS plenary sessions. Based on our content analysis of the civil society plenary email archive, we found numerous examples of members expressing high levels of frustration with the CSB. For example, observe the following statement highlighting the abysmal communication practices of the CSB and how it was initially constituted. 9
Let me only add that the civil society bureau has been highly controversial since its proposal at Prepcom2. Apparently, this situation is not improving, specially since some of the CSB members seem to speak for themselves, without any mandate . . . Although there were disagreement on this constitution for the reason stated above, the two only volunteers were "appointed" . . . Since then, I've seen neither any report nor any request for comments or proposal on any issue raised in the CSB. . . . If it was not thanks to ____ forwarding some important messages to the plenary, or through ___ sending some messages adressed by the CSD to the CSB, I would never hear of what's being discussed -and, who knows?, decided -in the CSB.
I don't know of other "families". But this absence of legitimacy and representatitity, as well as this opacity, speak for themselves. The civil society plenary, which does exist simply because we have commonly created it following consensus and because we are using it, remains the most legitimate instance.
The CSB was set up primarily as an interface with the WSIS secretariat and the corresponding entity for governments called the Government Bureau. However, what became clear is that the CSB engaged in what some organizational theory scholars call "mission creep," and was trying to move further into work on substantive matters of ICT policy. Clariªcation on these issues was ªnally provided with the following rationale from a CSB member.
In the recent Paris meeting, nobody in the CS-B questioned the fact that the CS-B is NOT responsible for content related issues. If content related issues pop up in the CS-B, the CS-B should transfer this issue to the CS-CTG or the relevant caucuses, themes groups etc. The so-called "families" of the CS-B are representig groups of networks and coordinate the activities of these networks formally. They are NOT content groups, although there is some overlapping (take the "media family" and the "media themes group" as an example. But note also that there is an "CS Internet Governance Caucus" but no "Internet Governance Family"). In the family, the organisations, which are linked to them, keep their own position and have no obligation, to take a common position on an issue (like in the "Trade Union" family, where you can have a unique position on procedural question, but divergent voices on content themes, which is both natural and does not create any problems, because the CS-B is responsible for procedural qustions only. To make it short: A family is NOT a CS negotiating body, the CS negotiating bodies are the content and themes groups and caucuses.
This e-mail, along with others in the archive, and participant observation indicate that the component of the CS structures that appears to have the highest degree of structural power is the Content & Themes Working Group (C&T). From the preceding note, we see a frequently occurring posture within the WSIS civil society that the "bureau doesn't do content"-it is only an administrative body. Any "content related issues" that emerge within the CSB are supposed to be relegated to the C&T Working Group. Of course, in an international ICT policy conference that is working to forge a global consensus on the principles, values, norms, and rules for the global governance of information infrastructure and the Information Society, content is of primary importance.
Tensions Between CSB and CSP From within the civil society sector itself, C&T is seen as "the main body created by the Civil Society Plenary (CSP) of WSIS at the ªrst Prepcom to bring together the content proposals of civil society organizations participating in the WSIS process" (Ó Siochrú, Kleinwaechter, & Bloem, 2003) . Following C&T as the second most powerful component in the structure, but in some delegates' minds having the most "legitimacy," is the CSP. The CSP, which is deªned as anyone who is signed onto the Plenary email list, tried to be the most open and broad-based component of the WSIS CS.
Contrary to this perspective, some delegates have argued that a WSIS civil society "plenary" does not and could not exist within the WSIS structures, as does one CSB member here.
There does not exist a forum at the WSIS referred to as "Civil Society Plenary," nor was there ever one at any other U.N. sponsored Summit in the past. A "Plenary" signiªes a ªxed group of members or member states and the actual ofªcial deªnition is: 1. Complete in all respects, unlimited or full: a diplomat with plenary powers, 2. Fully attended by all qualiªed members: a plenary session of the council. As you can see, Civil Society does not fulªll this deªnition or its prerequisites. In Paris, we had three (3) mechanisms . . . Nonetheless, the transnational civil society used these various structures to organize its work and to engage with the WSIS policy processes. They were able to produce ªve signiªcant policy documents and statements, most in three languages (English, Spanish, and French), and to post them on the Web in rich-text, pdf, text, and html formats.
Current WSIS Civil Society CMC Practices
The primary focus of this research question is: "Did the civil society groupings involved in WSIS use computer-mediated communication to organize their work and participate in the WSIS?" We ªnd that the greatest communication within the WSIS civil society sector takes place using e-mail lists, with nearly all of the civil society respondents to our international survey (n ϭ 47, 89%) reporting that they have communicated with colleagues in the sector "frequently" or "very frequently" using e-mail lists over the past 6 months. 10 More advanced communication tools are used infrequently, such as blogs (n ϭ 43, 90%) either "not at all" or "very infrequently," or wiki webs (n ϭ 44, 96%) being used even less frequently. The organization of these civil society structures began with support for their distributed work via CMC tools starting after the Prepcom-2 in February 2003. The ªrst plenary mail list was set up in March, with only one "test" message being transmitted (248 bytes). In April, the trafªc picked up slightly (10 KB), with almost immediate calls by some within the sector to use Web-based tools to facilitate their geographically distributed work, such as editing, voting, and other aspects of developing proposals and policy papers. For example, this excerpt taken from only the third e-mail posted to the newly established e-mail list for the civil society plenary calls for volunteers to provide collaboration tools.
We need volunteers to help facilitate the technical aspects of this proposal. We are trying to identify a Web-based tool that will assist us in this process (ed. group editing, voting, etc.). We have collected a list of candidate systems. We need volunteers who have Linux system administration experience and also people or organizations who could possibly host a system on their server.
Subsequently, when talking about proposed working practices it was publicized that the civil society hoped to have available an "online collaborative editing tool."
As the CSP prepared for the Paris Intersessional Meeting July 15-18, 2003, new calls were made for face-to-face assistance, for individuals to act as the "eyes and ears" at the Intersessional meeting for the rest of the CSP. One plenary member volunteered for and called for assistance to coordinate an "NGO Monitoring Group" for the Intersessional meeting, reporting back to the entire Plenary the work of the meeting. In stating the importance of this function, this CSP member said:
I believe this reporting is a critical function for us to play, since I am sure some governments are counting on the fact that much fewer NGOs will be able to attend the intersessional in such an expensive city during the height of the tourist season. The only way all our voices can be heard is if groups around the world know what is going on in a timely manner.
While the complexity and diversity of the civil society structures reºect the diversity and nature of civil society itself, organizing the sector for effective participation in an equally complicated global ICT policy process like WSIS becomes particularly difªcult. This difªculty is compounded by the more limited ªnancial resources available to civil society delegates, relative to other sectors such as global and multinational corporations organized as the Coordination Committee of Business Interlocutors (CCBI) and coordinated by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).
Dilemma of Existing WSIS Civil Society Structures
The WSIS Civil Society sector has worked diligently to encourage civil society organizations from around the world to participate actively in its processes; however, there is still concern that the variety of civil society organizations around the world is not represented adequately within the existing civil society structures. This presents the WSIS civil society with a difªcult dilemma. On one horn of the dilemma, there are no global structures in place to elect and represent the vast diversity of civil society interests at the international level. This is true even for the business sector (although big business organizations such as the ICC and the CCBI are well organized and effective at the international level, these organizations are not necessarily representative of the diversity of private-sector views, such as small, medium, and micro-sized enterprises). Nevertheless, the private-sector actors have more homogeneity than does civil society; private-sector actors have long-established organizational structures through which to work out their differences. They also have greater ªscal and institutional resources with which to address the problem. Civil society organizations will never be able to get sufªcient resources to ensure that all the civil society interests around the world are adequately represented. Further, they lack the organizational structures that would allow them to make decisions about these difªcult questions and to develop sufªcient solutions. At present, civil society is forced to rely on those well-resourced members of the sector that physically attend all of the preparatory meetings, and hope that the wellresourced adequately represent the less-wellresourced interests.
On the other horn of the dilemma, if the WSIS civil society does rely on those well-resourced members actually present at the meetings to "represent" them and to interpret for them, this leaves the civil society sector vulnerable to the dominant interpretations of a few, self-selected elite individuals. As it is, many of these elite individuals with the resources to Volume 1, Number 3-4, Spring-Summer 2004 25 COGBURN participate in these meetings operate in a cliquish nature that makes it difªcult for newcomers to engage. For example, one CSP member from France argued as much in the following e-mail excerpt.
Thank you for your warm wishes ; I send attached to this e-mail the text of my presentation at the SC-2 plenary on thursdy in both english and french. I take the opportunity to stress once more that themes such as these dealt with in my presentation are completely "off the agenda" in the SC meetings and at least not considered as priorities in our debates. 
Recognizing the Potential of CMC Tools for WSIS Civil Society
Many of these apparent liabilities can perhaps be turned into assets through the more extensive use of computer-mediated communication and collaboration tools and practices. Following the Paris Intersessional meeting, additional information was produced regarding the need for civil society to collaborate more effectively, and to mind the needs geographically distributed knowledge work. The discussions on the list then turned to strategy. One CSP member produced and circulated a detailed document to the sector urging them to consider the importance of remote participation:
We should always have in mind the people who are not able to come to Geneva. They depend on us for the latest infos on what is going on, and we depend on (some of) them for their input and ideas in our lobbying work. The "info security" caucus for example consisted at least of two persons not present in Geneva and Paris, but who were actively involved. This principle also should help us think of all the interested people in Geneva who do not belong to the "inner circle" (whatever this is).
This delegate produced a recommendation as to the structure of civil society that would lead to maximization of its collective resources, arguing even more forcefully for the use of CMC and collaboration tools.
. . . live-feed of the monitors in the plenary sessions to IRC or elsewhere,with the possibility for real-time comments and analysis via the internet (I imagine something like this : "ONLINE CS PAR-TICIPANT FROM KOREA: last comment from delegation XYZ is dangerous. It would imply ABC, and they have already tried this at the asian regional conf.") -have a screen, in a room for CS, which broadcasts comments which could include extracts from email messages, realtime chats, etc.
-have a videofeed from the sessions broadcast over the internet
Evaluation of WSIS Civil Society Use of CMC
The second research question for this study asks, "How did the civil society groupings involved in WSIS use computer-mediated communications? What barriers did these civil society groupings face, and how did they overcome these barriers?" As we have shown above, the organizational structure of the WSIS civil society sector is highly complex and geographically distributed across multiple countries, multiple organizations, multiple subunits of caucuses, task forces, families, content and themes, plenary, and bureau. Working in a complex, geographically distributed environment such as this one poses numerous challenges (Olson & Olson, 2000) . Some of these challenges include building trust and common ground (Rocco, 1998) , coordinating the activities and communications of distributed teams (Kiesler et al., 1984) , and discussion control (Kraut et al., 1982) . With the inclusion of participants from both developed and developing countries, as is the case in the WSIS civil society, these problems are further complicated, including managing interinstitutional and cross-national cultural differences (McCroskey, 1990 ) and differential experience with CMC tools (Gersick, 1988) .
Understanding the Dimensions of Collaboration Readiness
In much of the scholarly work done on the use of CMC tools to support geographically distributed collaboration in science, one institutional form that has received signiªcant attention is the "collaboratory" (Wulf, 1989) . Studies of collaboratories have shown that one of the most important indicators of potential success of geographically distributed collaboration within a collaboratory is a concept known as "collaboration readiness" (Olson & Olson, 2000; 26 Information Technologies and International Development Olson, Finholt & Teasley, 2000; Olson, Teasley, Bietz, & Cogburn, 2003) .
As its name suggests, collaboration readiness attempts to measure the degree to which a geographically distributed group has the socio-technical foundation to support the introduction and use of more advanced CMC and collaboration tools. In the literature, the concept of collaboration readiness has three important dimensions, articulated here as: (1) collaboration orientation readiness, (2) collaboration infrastructure readiness, and (3) collaboration technology readiness. We will use this framework to analyze the degree to which the WSIS civil society has used CMC tools that may predict their success at instituting the more advanced collaboration tools that the ªndings in the previous section suggest are necessary.
Collaboration Orientation Readiness
Evidence of collaboration orientation readiness can be found in the friendliness and openness of communication within the distributed community: a willingness to share ideas and information, and to support members of the community. Given that the WSIS civil society "community" exists primarily through its e-mail lists and Web sites (and only on occasion during its face-to-face meetings, which we also observed), analyzing those e-mail communications for evidence of this "collaboration orientation" provides a useful, although limited, measure of the willingness of the WSIS civil society to collaborate.
For example, in the e-mail trafªc leading up to one of the ªrst important face-to-face meetings, the Paris Intersessional meeting on Content & Themes, one CSP member commented about how expensive Paris was, another member responded with the following humorous and encouraging message:
Just one point I don't agree with you : Paris is'nt such an expensive city ! It's (far) less expensive that Geneva and much more funny ! And you can really enjoy this fun because -unlike in Genevait's affordable. So please don't worry " you'll be fairly well there. At least I hope so. Another humorous aspect of the level of collaboration orientation readiness within the WSIS civil society can be found in an exchange from a person wanting to have his name and organization added to one of the civil society family mailing lists.
Hi All, talking about Caucuses and Families. . . Whom can I direct myself to if the head of the media-'family' (Mr. ____) doesn't answer my e-mails in which I ask him to include me in this family? Does anybody know about a 'supreme family court' or something like that? Thanks for orientation! Shortly thereafter, the person responsible for the family in question responded with another humorous e-mail continuing the legal metaphors, as this excerpt indicates:
Dear Plaintiff (___________)-Sorry I haven't answered you. I had a very serious operation at the start of April, and, as soon I was able, I had to go on three out-of-town trips in succession. There is nothing magical or mysterious about joining the media family. When we meet during the intersession in Paris or at Prepcom 3 in Geneva, the meeting times and places will be posted, and you should show up if you are in town. . . . I hope this satisªes any desire you may have for litigation. Best regards, This is the kind of communication pattern that illustrates a high level of collaboration orientation readiness. While we are only presenting here a sample of this type of communication, there are numerous examples within the database.
While our assessment is that there is a high level of collaboration orientation readiness, exhibited by cheerful communication, transparency, and openness, the sector is not without its problems. At one point in June, in the middle of a particularly chatty thread discussing the various lists that were being created to facilitate cooperation, one CSP member sent the following e-mail, all in capital letters, and then deliberately signing their name in lower case letters.
CAN ANYONE TELL ME WHAT THIS FORUM IS ALL ABOUT. YOU CAN'T REALLY BE SENDING US E-MAILS TALKING ABOUT THIS OR THAT LIST WHEN CLEARLY THAT COULD BE DONE PRI-VATELY. IF THIS FORUM WAS CREATED FOR THIS KIND OF COMMUNICATION THENPLEASE TAKE US OFF. name
Another participant who agreed, in principle, with the sentiment of the initial post, but in turn did not appreciate the format of the complaining message followed this up quickly with the following message:
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No offense intended
In the world of e-mail "netiquette," sending a message in all capital letters is considered shouting. The hostility was diffused expertly and a potential "ºame war" averted by one of the list moderators who answered by saying:
hi _____, It's a good point. Some of these communications don't need to be on the list. On announcement with a request to send information to a private email address should sufªce. At the moment, we are simply trying to bring together as much information as we can, about existing WSIS caucuses (regional and thematic) and their work spaces . . . and to make that information available via a central point. . . .
As the policy processes unfolded, CSP members began to use their e-mail list to coordinate their work more effectively. For example, when debates emerged regarding the draft civil society input into the Paris Intersessional meeting, one CSP member asserted: "What do you mean by this statement: 'We cannot, of course, expect a consensus document to be perfect for everyone; that is part of the compromise that consensus implies.'" The original author again averted conºict by responding courteously: "Simply that every organization will still ªnd something they would have liked included or improved."
Finally, one last aspect of the high level of collaboration orientation readiness is found in the levels of trust within the civil society sector. In our international survey, we measured a general level of trust, as well as two different and well-known dimensions of trust, cognitive trust and affective trust. High levels of trust are seen as one of the most important predictors of the success of geographically distributed collaboration and are, unfortunately, one of the most difªcult characteristics to build. All three of these measures of trust have been used to assess the level of collaboration readiness of global virtual teams and participants in other types of geographically distributed knowledge-oriented work from science to industry.
In analyzing the results from this survey, we ªnd that there is a high degree of general trust among members of the WSIS civil society, both in general and among the members of civil society. On a binary measure of trust (i.e., "most people can be trusted;" "most people cannot be trusted"), a vast majority of civil society (n ϭ 66, 93%) reported high levels of general trust. When we look speciªcally at two important dimensions of trust-affective and cognitive trust-we also ªnd high levels. For example, a majority of civil society respondents (64%) either "agree" or "strongly agree" with an index of items measuring cognitive trust within the sector (e.g., members "are reliable and will not make my job more difªcult by careless work," rated on a scale of 1-5, with 5 being "strongly agree"). On an index of items measuring affective trust within the sector (e.g., "We have a sharing relationship; We can freely share our ideas, feelings, and hopes"), the majority of civil society respondents (65%) chose either "agree" or "strongly agree."
These selected examples illustrate the high level of collaboration orientation readiness, and the possibility of building on this foundation to further develop the collaboration infrastructure and communication technologies within the civil society sector.
Collaboration Infrastructure Readiness
Another component of the framework used to analyze the WSIS civil society use of computer-mediated communication is the concept of collaboration infrastructure readiness. This aspect is measured by looking for the existence of an organizational and structural infrastructure to support geographically distributed collaboration. We will continue to present evidence of the level of collaboration infrastructure readiness of the WSIS civil society sector.
As mentioned above, although far from perfect, the WSIS civil society has numerous organizational structures within which to organize its geographically distributed work. Following Prepcom-2, several electronic working spaces were established for civil society. Some within civil society called this an "online reorganization" and saw it as part of the overall process of formalizing the structure of the Civil Society Plenary (CSP). This online reorganization included the creation of a CS domain, Web site, and mailing lists. Subsequently, the Content & Themes group set up an online collaboration space called BSCW (Basic Support for Collaborative Work) to help coordinate the drafting of documents by a wide range of geographically distributed participants.
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Another illustration of collaboration infrastructure readiness within civil society, is the way in which members of one structure work to keep members of other parts of the structure informed, especially the CSP. This principle of "transparency and openness" is embedded within the ethos of the WSIS civil society-although not always practiced.
For example, the following e-mail exchange shows how several of the CSB members made a concerted attempt to use the e-mail lists to keep the rest of the plenary informed of what the Bureau was doing. By the middle of July, after the Paris Intersessional meeting, over 240 persons around the world were members of the Civil Society Plenary list. For example, one CSB member posted an early message in May, saying: This is just to keep you up to date on some Bureau activities. At the bottom is a note sent from the CSD [Civil Society Division of the WSIS Secretariat] to Bureau Members, which has some useful information about the process.
Notes of this sort help to bridge the information asymmetry between "Bureau" members and the rest of the Plenary. They also help build trust among the civil society sector as a whole, and toward speciªc civil society members (such as those frequently posting these messages and thus "exhibiting" the principles of transparency).
Collaboration Technology Readiness
Finally, the last component of the framework used to analyze the WSIS civil society use of CMC tools is the concept of collaboration technology readiness. This component of the framework looks for evidence of civil society members actually using collaboration technology as they conduct their geographically distributed knowledge work. On this aspect of the analysis, the ªndings are mixed. While there are examples of the use of some more advanced CMC tools such as wikis, document repositories, and instant messaging, these attempts met with limited success. From our survey, we know that the majority of communication within the WSIS civil society sector takes place using e-mail lists, with nearly all of the civil society respondents (n ϭ 47, 89%) reporting that they have communicated with colleagues in the sector "frequently" or "very frequently" using e-mail lists over the past 6 months. The more advanced CMC tools envisioned by this analytical category are used less infrequently within the WSIS civil society. For example, the majority of civil society respondents (n ϭ 43, 90%) have used blogs "not at all" or "very infrequently." Similarly, nearly all of civil society respondents (n ϭ 44, 96%) reported using wikis either "not at all" or "very infrequently." However, with that said, some members of the WSIS civil society use collaboration technology to engage in their distributed collaboration. For example, in addition to the multiple e-mail lists, they set up a Web-based portal as a document repository to help them develop multiple documents for use during the WSIS Prepcom process. The following e-mail excerpt illustrates the introduction of these new collaboration technologies. Yet another example of the use of the collaboration technology readiness of civil society is the use of an IRC (Internet Relay Chat) channel for WSIS established by one CSP member who announced it to the Plenary in the following e-mail excerpt:
Just a quick note to let you all know that I have setup a WSIS IRC chat channel. with it, we'll be able to chat in realtime both before, during and after the upcoming Prepcom. the details are as follows . . .
Later, another participant set up a Web log to talk about Content & Themes issues:
I just set up a blog we can use to informe the CT Group about the advancement of the sub committee 2 sessions. To read, please go to wsiscs.blogspot.com To contribute, please send me your name and your email address. I will send you all the instructions.
Unfortunately, although both of these collaboration technologies-one synchronous (IRC) and the other asynchronous (BSCW)-were established and advertised within the civil society plenary, they Volume 1, Number 3-4, Spring-Summer 2004 29 received little overall use within the community. These early efforts to introduce more advanced collaboration technologies were followed up on several occasions by other-and different-civil society members, mostly with the same result. I should note that none of these attempts to introduce more advanced collaboration technologies came from the organization that provides the primary e-mail list and Web site support. One might wonder what would have happened had this powerful organization been the one to introduce these new collaboration technologies. One might also wonder why they have not attempted to do so.
However, on a brighter note, other-simpler, but broadcast only-synchronous technologies were used by the conference organizers themselves. During Prepcom-3 in Geneva, the International Telecommunications Union organized live video streaming from the conference center. There was evidence that a number of civil society members were logged on and watching the proceedings from locations around the world. When this video streaming was coupled with the up-to-date reporting by civil society members on the ground, it helped to involve participants more actively in the process as the following two e-mail posts illustrate.
And yes, I am checking this webcast from my Tokyo home with cable broadband connection, and at least the audio is very clear. They don't show the speakers from the clear. And no translationis hard for non-English speeches to understand. I feel not too remote . . . but missing all the great friends to mingle. Now they ªnished para 40, right?" This note was followed quickly by one from another remote participant saying, Across the sea here, in a very different time zone, Vancouver, BC is also following the sessionsthank you virtual global community for this opportunity! Based on this mixed evidence, we still conclude that the WSIS civil society has a high level of overall collaboration readiness, but there are substantial power dynamics at play within the community that make it difªcult to introduce innovative, more advanced collaboration technologies.
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DIVERSITY MATTERS: CIVIL SOCIETY IN WSIS
Figure 2. Screenshot of Web-based Digital Repository Used by Civil Society.
Previous research has shown that epistemic communities-or networks of knowledge-producing policyactors-can work to promote the convergence of knowledge and interpretive schemas within public policy processes (Haas, 1980 (Haas, , 1990 . While the earliest deªnition of an "epistemic community" comes from Foucault (1973) , a more appropriate deªnition comes later from Haas et al. (1977) . They argue that an epistemic community is "a network of individuals and groups who are able to inºuence the future by virtue of their shared specialized knowledge of certain crucial phenomena." These epistemic communities "seek to use their knowledge as a way of organizing cognition collectively" (Haas et al., 1977, p. 38 ) and contribute to global governance through their direct and indirect inºuence of the dense transnational networks of policy makers and issue stakeholders. Some scholars call these dense networks "policy-actor networks" (Slaughter, 2001; Bockman & Eyal, 2002) and others call them "transnational advocacy networks" (Kirk and Sikkink, 1998; Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004) . Regardless of name, these networks are a key source of integrating knowledge and bringing new ideas into the international decision-making process, and as a result, are a critical variable in understanding regime formation and global governance for the Information Society.
Given the importance of epistemic communities in global policy processes and their potential linkages with transnational advocacy networks, the third research question for this study asks, "To what extent do these CMC practices reveal the existence of policy networks within the WSIS civil society and what is their relationship with epistemic communities?"
This research question has produced some of the most exciting ªndings. A majority of civil society delegates (66%, n ϭ 31) agree or strongly agree that they "work in concert with other experts in [their] ªeld to disseminate [their] ideas to the global ICT policy community." Interestingly, when given an explicit deªnition of a "global policy network" and then asked if they are involved in such a network, an even larger majority (77%, n ϭ 39) answered yes. 11 This ªnding is in line with the earlier work done by Kirk & Sikkink (1998) on transnational advocacy networks in environment and gender issues, and provides some of the ªrst empirical evidence for the existence of transnational advocacy networks within the ICT policy domain. Since this study seems to conªrm the existence of these transnational net- 
This second question was asked as triangulation for the ªrst question on policy networks. The explicit deªnition provided to respondents was as follows: "A 'Global Policy Network' can be deªned as an international network of policy-actors that could consist of governmental and/or non-governmental actors. Frequently, the members of such a Global Policy Network will interact as delegates to international conferences where they attempt to work collectively to inºuence the outcome of the conference." Table 3. Overview of Civil Society Structures
Civil Society Plenary
CSP is open to everyone and is the main body of civil society for discussion and general decision making.
Civil Society Bureau CCSB functions as an interlinkage between the CSCT and the intergovernmental Bureau for procedural and technical issues.
Content & Themes CSCT coordinates the work of the numerous regional and thematic caucuses and working groups. It is the main body for discussion and decisions on content-related issues.
Civil Society Families CSF represents the various themes and interests of members on the ureau, a total of 20 including regional representation.
Thematic Caucuses and Working Group
TCWG also represents the various thematic interests within the civil society, including cities and local authorities, community media caucus, cultural and linguistic diversity, e-government/e-democracy, education and academia caucus, education and academia LAC, environment and ICTs, human rights, indigenous peoples, global ICT governance, media, gender strategies, patents, copyrights and trademarks, persons with disabilities, privacy and security, scientiªc information, trade unions, values and ethics, volunteering and ICTs.
works, there is the possibility that these networks can be strengthened through strategic policy interventions which may include even more types of participants found in previous research, such as sympathetic government representatives, private sector, foundations, and international organization allies, and tie them even more tightly to epistemic communities and globally organized advocacy activities. Even further in this regard, when asked about their impact on global ICT policy processes, a majority (67%, n ϭ 28) felt that their ideas have been either important or very important in inºuencing the perspectives of global ICT policy-actors and a large majority (79%, n ϭ 26) believe that their global policy network has helped them to inºuence global ICT policy processes. Finally, nearly all (84%, n ϭ 26) of the respondents that identiªed themselves with a global policy network believed that their network was "associated with a group of scholars, scientists, or other continuous source of knowledge and information," meaning an epistemic community.
When asked whether they worked "to generate specialized knowledge on issues relevant to global ICT policy" within their organization, a large majority (83%) responded afªrmatively. The most frequently cited (34%, n ϭ 14) method for disseminating their specialized knowledge to the global ICT policy community is through "public presentations (e.g., conferences)." Most civil society delegates (89%, n ϭ 39) rely on other civil society organizations for the knowledge and information necessary to prepare for global ICT policy conferences, as opposed to government, private sector, or international organization resources. However, a minority of respondents (47%, n ϭ 22) agree or strongly agree that they "have sufªcient knowledge and information to be effective in global ICT policy processes." These issues will be explored more fully in future research.
The fourth research question asks, "What was the effect of the WSIS civil society's use of computermediated communication?" One of the most important measures of "success" in a United Nations summit is the degree to which delegations are able to get speciªc language into the conference documents (Schechter, 2001) . When exploring the success and satisfaction of civil society in the WSIS policy formulation processes, we have chosen two measures. The ªrst is a subjective measure of the perceived efªcacy of one's organization in inºuencing the WSIS documents. The second is also a subjective measure of the perceived success of one's organization at getting speciªc language into the WSIS documents.
Interestingly, a slim majority of civil society organizations (54%, n ϭ 38) felt either successful or very successful at getting speciªc language into the WSIS policy formulation process. However, when asked about their speciªc impact on the two major WSIS documents, a minority (26%, n ϭ 11) "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that they had a "signiªcant impact on the WSIS Declaration of Principles, and an even smaller number (19%, n ϭ 8) felt that they had a signiªcant impact on the WSIS Action Plan.
From the perspective of civil society, the key policy issues to be included in the WSIS Declaration of Principles are encapsulated by an overarching focus on using the GII to create a more people-oriented Information Society. As an example of the pursuit of policy alternatives within the civil society sector, one plenary member sent the following e-mail to the plenary list:
Alternatives to the World Summit on the Information Society 'A discussion list for people planning alternatives to the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) including another summit, countersummit, walkout, protest, or other strategies to advance communication as a human right and as a public good. To counter corporate hijacking of the WSIS for private interest or Bushwacking of the WSIS in the name of a 'war on cyberterrorism.' Table 4 presents an overview of the key policy issues of the civil society sector. Most of these issues became the centerpiece of the civil society inputs into WSIS process, and were the focal point for civil society discontent with the draft WSIS Declaration of Principles and the WSIS Action Plan (Global Contract Foundation, 2003) . This led the civil society to release an alternative document at WSIS called the WSIS Civil Society Benchmark.
Before we move on to our discussion and implications, I brieºy summarize the ªndings of the study. In this study, we asked four research questions.
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The ªrst research question asks, "Did the civil society groupings involved in WSIS use computermediated communication to organize their work and participate in the WSIS?" What we ªnd is that e-mail is the most widely used CMC within the WSIS civil society, with more complex asynchronous tools such as document repositories, wikis, and blogs, and synchronous tools such as Web conferencing, not being used. The most widely used technologies within the sector are maintained by one or only a few organizations. These few organizations, and a limited number of others in the inner circle, most of which are based in Geneva, Paris, or New York-in proximity to the face-to-face WSIS meetings, wield the technology and geographic resources for leadership within the sector.
The second research question asks, "How did the civil society groupings involved in WSIS use computer-mediated communications? What barriers did these civil society groupings face, and how did they overcome those barriers?" Here, we ªnd that civil society has a high level of what scholars of computer-mediated cooperative work (CMCW) call collaboration readiness. This concept of collaboration readiness, with its three distinct dimensions of collaboration orientation readiness, collaboration infrastructure readiness, and collaboration technology readiness, helps us to understand how likely civil Here we present some of the more exciting ªndings of the study. We ªnd that a signiªcant majority of civil society participants do see themselves as members of global policy networks. To our knowledge, this is some of the earliest empirical evidence for the existence of transnational advocacy networks in the global ICT policy arena. Members of these policy networks also appear to have signiªcant linkages with knowledge-producing epistemic communities. This combination should assist the global community in facilitating the knowledge exchange and human capacity development required to strengthen the effectiveness of developing countries and civil society organizations within these emergent regime formation processes.
Finally, the fourth research question asks, "What was the effect of the WSIS civil society's use of computer-mediated communication?" Here we ªnd that while civil society members have been active participants in nearly all aspects of the WSIS policy formulation processes including preparatory stages and the Summit itself, they have been fairly ineffective at inºuencing the process. This ªnding is certainly in line with those of previous studies of developing country and civil society involvement in global policy formulation processes.
To build a truly equitable global Information Society and to harness the potential of information and communication technologies for socio-economic development, the active participation of a diverse transnational civil society is critical, even if mainly through computer-mediated communication. In the multistakeholder processes of the World Summit on the Information Society, the transnational civil society sector plays a critically important role, representing much of the energy and applied innovation of the global Information Society. The active and theoretically co-equal involvement of the international civil society in these global governance processes is a major step forward. Their involvement is an explicit recognition, at least on the part of the organizers and most of the participants, that civil society brings to these processes a diverse array of subject-matter expertise in many of the policy areas addressed by the Summit, as well as the energy and resources to continue developing many applications and projects that give rise to the Information Society.
Civil society participation is critical not only because of the diversity of perspectives and expertise it brings to the table, but also because in many countries, these are the very organizations that will play a leading role in implementing the WSIS Plan of Action. Without the support and participation of these civil society organizations, the potential of the information and communication society will be severely limited. This dual reference to civil society as both an organization and an actor reºects the challenges pointed out by Keck & Sikkink: "part of what is so elusive about networks is that they seem to embody elements of agent and structure simultaneously" (1998, p. 5) . They continue with the following:
When we ask who creates networks and how, we are inquiring about them as structures-as patterns of interactions among organizations and individuals. When we talk about them as actors, however, we are attributing to these structures an agency that is not reducible to the agency of their components. (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 5) .
Based on our analysis, there appears to be a high level of collaboration readiness within the sector, with high levels of good will, information, sharing, trust, and basic asynchronous collaboration technology infrastructure. The sector has been aided by organizations, such as the APC, Computer Profes-
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Information Technologies and International Development sionals for Social Responsibility, and others, in using e-mail lists and other CMC tools to attempt to harness the talents and energies of the members of its sector from around the world. While the diffusion of the more advanced technologies has not been as widespread within the sector as desired by its proponents, and while the organizational structures and decision-making capabilities need to be revised, the overall ability for the sector to collaborate is robust, resulting in a series of ªne intellectual contributions to the WSIS preparatory process and to the Summit itself.
However, by any number of measures, the current WSIS process has not been able to include sufªciently the voices of civil society. For example, during Prepcom-3, the Civil Society delegates were not allowed to participate fully in the working groups where key and sometimes contentious issues of the draft WSIS Declaration of Principles and the WSIS Plan of Action were being discussed (civil society and private sector participation was limited to the ªrst 5 minutes of the meeting). This led to considerable frustration and to the production of an analysis of civil society participation in the WSIS preparatory process called "From Input to Impact," which argued that more than 60% of the civil society recommendations to the ªnal declaration had been completely ignored (Global Contract Foundation, 2003) . Further, the decision to "resume" Prepcom-3 from November 10-14, 2003 without providing fellowships for civil society delegates, and even excluding some countries (e.g., Argentina) from receiving fellowships to the actual Summit, meant that key elements of the ªnal documents were decided by a group too small to represent the multiple stakeholders and their diverse interests in the global Information Society.
As a result of these developments, many call WSIS a failure, and there are continued suggestions that the civil society should disengage from the process and refuse to continue being "pawns" in a multistakeholder process that will not fully consider and integrate their perspectives. On the other hand, if civil society can use the WSIS process as a catalyst for stimulating dense, robust networks that can engage more effectively in global governance processes, it will have been a tremendous success.
By one perspective, the civil society sector can be seen as an example for other participants in this global multistakeholder process. We have shown that with limited resources, civil society has developed complex organizational structures sufªcient to pull together coherent, focused, substantive, and powerful intellectual contributions to the WSIS process. We have shown that the WSIS civil society has a high degree of collaboration readiness, including high levels of cognitive and affective trust. These characteristics are critical to engaging in long-term, substantive, geographically distributed collaborative knowledge work. We have also shown how, although limited primarily to e-mail lists and Webbased archives, civil society has been able to use CMC tools to involve people from around the world in their WSIS policy activities.
However, if civil society organizations are to forge a success out of the WSIS process, they must overcome some major challenges. They must learn how to capture the full potential of their ostensible membership by better organizing the diverse and geographically distributed civil society participants from around the world.
The WSIS civil society must address the twin issues that continue to be the "elephant in the living room," of these multistakeholder global governance processes. These twin problems are legitimacy and structure. The legitimacy issue has multiple prongs (Hudson, 2001) . First, there is the question of whom the participants in the WSIS civil society actually represent. The overall number of civil society participants is large. Most of them come from Western Europe (32%), are well educated (modal education level: master's degree), and male (64%). Africa makes up the second largest percentage of civil society delegates (27%). However, with some notable exceptions, there are few African delegates in formal or informal leadership positions within the civil society sector. Even fewer civil society leaders come from Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia, or the Middle East. Further, when many of the African delegates raise issues of importance to them, such as civil society support for the Digital Solidarity Fund, support for Tunisia as an African host for Phase II of the Summit, or increased mechanisms to facilitate enhanced virtual participation for those not physically able to attend the summit, these suggestions are generally met with lukewarm support, at best.
There are currently several major crises within the structure of civil society. There has been no resolution to numerous issues raised by delegates from around the world about the composition of the CSB, what role it should play vis-à-vis the plenary, how its members were appointed, whom they represent, whether or not the current members of the Bureau are supposed to continue into the second phase of the Summit, how individual members of the Bureau are replaced, what happens in the absence of a Civil Society Division (CSD) of the secretariat, and other unresolved issues. Individual caucuses have other problems, such as whether any member of the civil society Internet governance caucus will be chosen to participate in the UN Secretary General's Working Group on Internet Governance; and if so, who will be the "representative," how will they be chosen, and whom will they represent?
There seems to be no urgency to address these issues on the part of the members of the WSIS civil society. Currently, many of the fortunate ones are gearing up for the preparatory processes of the Tunis phase of WSIS. Many of the most fortunate are busy planning their travel plans to the seaside resort town of Hammamet, where Prepcom-1 will be held or to the numerous other thematic meetings that make up Phase II of the WSIS preparatory process. Yet the sector has not addressed any of the above issues, or prepared a strategy for what to do once those privileged few get to Tunis or the other venues. To date, there have been no widespread, systematic efforts to involve remote participants in the meetings, other than continuing the e-mail trafªc (though actually, there has been relatively little substantive e-mail trafªc on either plenary lists or the caucuses, which we monitor), and competing and uncoordinated offers to host civil society documents on various Web sites.
Perhaps most important, what happens to all of these issues when there is no funding available to support civil society participation in the process, or little willingness on the part of funding agencies and governments to commit the same level of funding as during the ªrst phase of the Summit. Interestingly, the African civil society has been perhaps the most active since leaving the Summit in December 2003. They have evolved a number of structures and mechanisms for organizing their regional cooperation, which include closer involvement with governments, the relevant regional and subregional organizations, and the private sector.
These ªndings set up one of the more disturbing implications of this study. While the transnational civil society sector has overcome tremendous obstacles, both internal and external, in its ability to organize itself in a geographically distributed manner using a wide range of CMC tools (though mostly limited to e-mail lists) and to tap into the creative energies, optimism, and dedication of those participating actively in the civil society sector, it has still had limited impact on the WSIS policy processes. Civil society efforts to promote a more socially oriented vision for the emerging global Information Society regime has been largely ineffectual. As a result, the WSIS policy documents represent more of an "information" society than the possible "communication" society articulated by some scholars (Ó Siochrú, 2004) , and look much more like the Global Electronic Commerce (GII/GEC) regime than the Global Information Society (GII/GIS) regime described by others (Cogburn, 2003) .
This reality has caused the conference organizers, participants, and supporters to assess what they learned from participation in Phase I of WSIS as they actively prepare for Phase II in Tunis. For the conference organizers-now located primarily within the Tunisian government-they see the added expense and logistical difªculties of trying to involve a diverse group of civil society voices from around the world. These realities are quite different from the private sector participants who not only fund their own travel and participation in these preparatory and Summit events, but often provide ªnancial support for the Summit itself. Many civil society participants lack the ªnancial resources to participate on their own, and thus require ªnancial assistance from the organizers or external sources, such as private foundations and development agencies. For civil society organizations, several questions emerge, such as, "Was it worth the effort to participate with so much energy, and still achieve such mediocre results? Will civil society organizations ever be 'equal' partners with governments; and perhaps more importantly, should they?" For funding and supporting agencies, they question if they should continue supporting the travel, accommodation, and other expenses for civil society and developing country participants to attend these meetings. Even with that said, there are already over 45 civil society participants registered to attend the June Prepcom1 of the Tunis phase.
Another implication of this study is that there is a certain understandable irony in the tension between governments and civil society, particularly with
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Information Technologies and International Development smaller governmental delegations. These small government delegations are often only one or two in number and must cope with complex substantive issues ranging from Internet governance to human rights. They are often unable to spread themselves across the wide varieties of thematic working groups. Even if they were able to attend to all of the themes, they frequently do not have the technical or substantive background on these issues. A great coalition could be formed by civil society organizations with their expertise and these small governments. Examples of this potential can be seen in the strategies employed by some civil society caucuses, such as the disability caucus, to work with like-minded government delegations to get their issues heard and included within the government plenary sessions.
One of the most encouraging ªndings in this study is that the majority of civil society participants are indeed members of global policy networks and that they draw heavily on existing epistemic communities. These policy networks and epistemic communities could be the basis upon which to build more robust structures-true transnational advocacy networks-to facilitate the geographically distributed collaboration of the sector. We will explore these possibilities in the future research described below.
Implications for the Theoretical Model and Global Governance
Based on this analysis, what follows are some initial thoughts about the relevance of the existing theoretical model. There seems to be an emerging recognition that an appropriate strategy might be to include civil society representatives within government delegations. This would allow civil society delegates to attend governmental meetings and "report" back to the overall civil society plenary about the debates, discussions, positions, and alternatives. One CSP member who produced an excellent account of the Paris Intersessional meeting suggested that this had been done with great success for one of the Western European delegations.
Further, this study supports the overall assertion of the model that international conferences matter to the global governance of cyberinfrastructure. These conferences play an important role in facilitating the convergence of expectations among actors that is required for regime formation to occur. In this case, the multiple WSIS preparatory processes, while contentious to the end, were able to keep most of the relevant participants in this multistakeholder process on board and the ªnal WSIS Declaration of Principles combined with the ªnal WSIS Action Plan provide a framework for "governing" the Information Society between the December 2003 Geneva Summit and the November 2005 Tunis Summit.
In closing, we offer three succinct recommendations that would contribute to Phase II. First, a signiªcant effort on the part of the organizers should be made to ensure that multiple mechanisms of virtual participation are available to all aspects of the WSIS Phase II preparatory processes and to the Tunis Summit itself. These "virtual" mechanisms must go beyond additional mailing lists and Web sites with information. These virtual mechanisms should embrace the principles described above to support geographically distributed collaborative knowledge work and learning. These CMC tools should be highly-interactive, rich media, and include voice, video, whiteboards, slides, Web sites, and other digital media. They should include a focus on enhancing the connections between three aspects of distributed policy collaboration: (1) people-to-people communication, (2) people-to-resources and other forms of organically organized digital repositories, and (3) peopleto-facilities, meaning synchronous access to the physical spaces of these preparatory meetings.
Second, since Phase II of WSIS is focusing on thematic issues, a signiªcant effort should be invested in human capacity-building around these issues. Building the capacity for delegations around the world to understand many of the complex thematic issues that are emerging-such as global Internet governance-to assess how these issues impact them, and to develop policy positions on them will be critical. Further, training among the WSIS civil society about how to engage in multilateral diplomacy and to engage productively with governments and with private sector delegates would be invaluable. Here again, embracing the many lessons learned about how to build human capacity in a geographically distributed manner is crucial to the success of these capacity building efforts (Cogburn and Levinson, 2003) .
Finally, the WSIS civil society should engage in the difªcult work of dealing with the questions of representation, legitimacy, and structures within the sector. This difªcult work includes developing the Volume 1, Number 3-4, Spring-Summer 2004 37 mechanisms for involving remote and diverse participation, creating structures that are as open and transparent as possible, taking steps to eliminate the cliquishness and secrecy (perceived or otherwise), developing coherent and consistent mechanisms for integrating and involving new people into the process, and evolving clear steps for decision making.
Unfortunately there are limited resources available to civil society, and even fewer institutional mechanisms. The institutional mechanisms that are there continue to ªght and contest within the sector for primacy space, and to protect their positions as "representatives" of the world's civil society. Governments do not have to deal with many of these issues. The United Nations certiªes who are memberstates, and each of those states has its own sovereignty and political processes-for better or worse-for determining who its representatives will be at such summits. The private sector, while still mostly representing the larger multinational corporations from the global North and not small, medium, and micro-sized organizations from the global South, has the resources to guarantee its participation. It is civil society that remains the most vulnerable in this process; and it is its own effective diverse voices that matter tremendously-even at a distance-to the success of the communication information and communication society, that are in danger of being silenced. ■ 
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